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During Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force Medical Service (AFMS) contributed to the lowest "died of wounds rate" in the history of warfare (less than 10 percent). 1 Cuttingedge medical care on the battlefield and revolutionary methods of transporting critically wounded patients, once miraculous, are now considered routine. 2 Simultaneously, while fielded medical forces are performing in a heroic manner, garrisoned AFMS providers, particularly surgeons and some medical specialists, are struggling to maintain their required wartime skills. Relying on just-in-time training and brief ingarrison dwell times coupled with multiple deployments, medical service personnel work to sustain skill sets needed for meeting both the active duty force's health needs and the wartime mission.
But when this war is over, how can the AFMS remain medically prepared for the next conflict? This contradiction in preparedness and performance resulted from two decades of changes in AFMS structure as well as the AFMS mission's duality. How did the AFMS get here? How can the system change to sustain skills, provide robust health care to all beneficiaries, and retain the expert staff needed for the mission? The story stretches back two decades, and a resolution may require looking outside the Department of Defense (DOD) to civilian and Veterans Affairs (VA) medical systems where currency-sustaining cases are more plentiful. Exploring this avenue may allow the restructuring of the current manpower lay down to meet these ends and continue efficient beneficiary care.
Setting the Stage
During the Cold War, the DOD maintained a robust medical service in preparation for casualties associated with Soviet aggression in Europe. Each service sustained significant medical footprints both inside the continental United States (CONUS) and overseas (OCONUS). To keep its aeromedical evacuation (AE) skills honed and maximize the use of its massive capacity, the AFMS utilized a highly developed medical air transport system to move patients to appropriate military treatment facilities (MTF) where they received specialty care if it was unavailable locally. In 1990 the AE system moved around 70,000 patients a year. 3 Near the end of the 1980s, the Soviet Union's demise flattened the defense budget. 4 However, health-care costs in both the civilian sector and the military health system (MHS) began to rise, driving the industry toward managed care. The MHS's rising costs began to take an increasing bite out of defense appropriations-a trend continuing to this day. The MHS budget accounts for $50 billion of the DOD fiscal year (FY) 2011 appropriations. This is a near quadrupling of the FY 1988 MHS budget ($14.6 billion), and costs continue to rise at 12 percent/year. 5 The Soviet Union's collapse also made it attractive for the United States to draw down military power and its budgets. Consequently, the AFMS reduced its footprint worldwide which, coupled with base realignment and closure recommendations, drove the AFMS from 108
MTFs (1983) to 75 MTFs (2010), consisting of four medical centers, 10 hospitals, and 61 clinics. 6 
Adapting to the New Order Has Consequences
To address costs and maintain health care quality and access for DOD beneficiaries, the DOD directed a civilian health and medical program of the uniformed services (CHAMPUS) reform initiative pilot project in 1987 to assess the effectiveness of outsourced health care. 7 The law mandates health care for DOD personnel and permits space available care for retirees and dependents. 8 The pilot proved successful, and TRICARE was born in the FY 1994 Defense Appropriations Act. 9 TRICARE shifted eligible beneficiary care (primarily retirees and dependents) to available civilian medical providers in a manner more cost effective than the direct care costs incurred by the MTFs. In some locales, active duty would also be referred to the network if MTF care was not available. TRICARE also allowed the available MTF staff to focus on active duty care and the required medical readiness mission. An obedient retiree population reluctantly adopted this new way of doing business, and dependent care started shifting to the civilian sector. An unintended consequence of creating TRICARE, downsizing the AFMS, and 6 conducting base realignments was the dramatic reduction in DOD physicians' exposure to complex patients requiring specialty care.
Compared with most Air Force support missions, the AFMS is unique in that it has dual readiness and peacetime missions, which have almost coequal priority due to the powerful incentive of the health care benefit on military recruitment and retention efforts. 10 When the AFMS maintained a robust inpatient capacity and manpower pool, servicing the health care benefit also provided the professional staff with most of their medical currency needs. This currency need was used to justify a large MHS footprint since the medical providers were fulfilling a dual purpose by preparing for war while caring for dependents and retirees, therefore producing a marginal cost savings. 11 With the aforementioned draw downs, this is no longer possible.
In addition to the numerical losses, the medical force mix requirements to meet both the healthcare benefit and the readiness mission pose challenges. The peacetime AFMS mission emphasizes primary care. Primary care needs are best met by a staff heavily weighted in family practitioners, pediatricians, and obstetrician/gynecologists. This type of health care is delivered chiefly in the ambulatory patient care setting. Primary care providers require access to specialized medical and surgical care to fully provide for their patients, but a large referral population is needed to generate a secondary case load for the consultant surgical and medical specialists to maintain viable skills.
With TRICARE and the outsourcing of patient care into the civilian network, this referral population has dwindled.
The war readiness mission depends heavily on surgical specialties, particularly general and orthopedic surgeons as well as trauma and critical care related specialists. These medical/surgical specialties depend significantly on an inpatient population with complex medical problems. 12 The shift in AFMS structure after the Cold War led to a reduction in both the number of military hospitals and inpatient bed capacity. In 1984 the AFMS inpatient bed capacity was 6,000. In 2006 it drifted below 1,000 and is lower today. 13 These programmatic shifts pose significant training and currency problems for surgical and medical specialists. The current AFMS patient caseload and complexity mix falls significantly short in several areas of providing the types and volume of cases recommended by medical professional and self-generated AFMS standards to maintain the required staff medical skills sets. The AFMS-assigned medical staff struggles to maintain their respective wartime skills. A large body of literature indicates the volume of experience and exposure to complex cases has a significant impact on the outcomes of surgical and medical care. 14 One study in particular demonstrated a reduction from 60 to 25 percent mortality for patients in shock from penetrating abdominal trauma (predominantly gunshot wounds) when seen in high-volume trauma centers when compared to lower volume facilities. 15 Additional experience also improves outcomes during subsequent periods of lower patient care volume. 16 As early as 1985, analysis showed that only a few Air Force surgeons were regularly exposed to wartime relevant cases. Peacetime procedure rates were also only a fraction of the rate needed to maintain wartime skills. 17 Surveys of general surgeons in 1985 showed more than 20 percent of surgeons were not comfortable with a range of combat type procedures such as anastomosis of peripheral vessels, lobectomy of the lung, liver resection, and urinary bladder repair believing they would need to "brush-up" before going to war. 18 Notably, this information was known before the bulk of TRICARE patient shifts and reductions had taken full effect. serve also as AFMS medical centers. 20 The AFMS surgical consultant also secured the ability to waive time-on-station requirements for selected surgical and medical specialists to allow their relocation back to a larger MTF after as little as two years when they have been assigned at a low volume, low acuity hospital setting. 21 
A Concept and Recommendations
Although improving operating room efficiencies, providing just-intime training, and setting up intermittent rotations are all positive steps in shoring up the needed medical skill sets, a more durable solution needs consideration. Medical currency needs could be maintained by integrating segments of the health profession staff into existing large volume civilian and VA medical facilities through a deliberate, multi-year rotational plan that expands the Center for Sustainment of Trauma and Readiness Skills (C-STARS)/STARS-P concepts. Physicians would enter a cycle of rotating into a civilian center, then moving back to the AFMS at a higher volume location before finally shifting to a smaller facility. The integration of doctors, nurses, and technicians into this cycle is desirable, but existing professional certification requirements, labor union concerns, and scope of practice differences involving the nursing and technician fields make it easier to focus only on the physicians first.
This model would not jeopardize the AFMS health care benefit as currently envisioned. In locations where robust civilian network care exists, beneficiaries would receive care from civilian providers as they do now. Integration into civilian and VA medical centers for currency could also provide an avenue for realignment of select primary care and specialty services at underserved CONUS locations where the civilian care network is sparse and OCONUS installations where host-nation health care can prove problematic due to language, standard of care, and cultural differences. Finally, opportunities provided by this integration model would decrease the dissatisfaction of many current AFMS providers as it relates to their inability to consistently employ the procedures for which they were trained and are expected to deliver to the battle wounded. This would likely lead to higher physician job satisfaction, retention, and recruitment. Although this integration concept might be new for the American MHS, it isn't without successful precedent.
A Proven Integration Model
In the 1990s, the United Kingdom (UK) integrated its MHS into its civilian health care system. 22 The civilian centers benefit because they avoid paying the RMS medical officer's salary. As for medical liability, it is a far simpler issue in the UK as compared to the United States in that there is nationalized health care in the form of the National Health Service (NHS). Physician credentialing is also simplified by the presence of a single, national licensing and accrediting body, the General Medical Council (GMC). Both these issues would be more complex to negotiate within the United States, but solutions are possible, albeit a full discussion is outside the scope of this paper. However, utilizing the VA system as an initial integration site may prove a workable first step and smooth the way forward while not directly addressing these two issues.
Hurdles-Systems Issues
Like the British, the US MHS is reluctant to move toward 30 The AFMS will also have to determine which specialties are best suited for integration and which medical services could undergo reorganization to make integration feasible, effective, and efficient.
Hurdles-Defining the Need
Integrating AFMS physicians into the civilian or VA health care system would provide a sustainable avenue for wartime skill set maintenance. The first step is identifying the specialties of greatest need whose requisite procedural numbers cannot be obtained. Using existing battle injury data, the greatest demand in the surgical arena is for orthopedic and general surgeons. More highly specialized neurosurgeons and vascular surgeons are also required, but this cohort group's size is measured in single digits, and as a result, their currency training is easier to achieve in existing large MTFs and other mechanisms.
Conversely, general surgeons perform a wide scope of damage control and trauma related surgery, and as a result, it is critical they be exposed to a larger case volume of sufficient complexity to keep their skills both honed and diversified. In the AFMS today, as previously noted in figures 1 and 2, these surgeons do not approach the required case levels and in garrison, perform procedures that do little to prepare them for a war. This reallocation will be discussed later.
Solutions-System/Liability
As referenced earlier, the US MHS faces legal and procedural hurdles in developing this integrated model. 
Solutions-Credentialing
If integration proceeded, physician licensure requirements would need addressing. A US national health system would most certainly increase license portability as it would likely federalize the accountability system. In lieu of a federalized licensing system, state medical boards might increase reciprocity agreements (even for a trial period and at least for the selected specialties) in a manner analogous to the interstate acceptance of a driver's license. This would undoubtedly take some time.
In the proposed system of deliberate rotation for two to three years, the degree of predictability would facilitate applying for and receiving licensure in the appropriate state even though this may take several months. The fees for a medical license range from the low hundreds to several hundreds of dollars. 33 AFMS or the civilian facility could bear the cost licensure, the latter option being made possible by the revenue generated by the Air Force physician practicing within the facility. In an experimental currency project based out of the RAF Lakenheath, England MTF, inbound physicians were able to achieve licensure before or shortly after arrival. If this degree of cooperation is achievable with a foreign country's regulatory structure, it seems the same could be achieved within the United States.
Liability for medical practice would be another major sticking 
Solutions-Integration of staff
Since AFMS physicians would provide augmentation of existing civilian staffs free of a payroll burden, civilian facilities would quite readily accept the loss of these physicians in the event of a national emergency requiring their deployment. In fact, the RAND survey report revealed civilian medical facilities were not overly concerned about the risk of deployment, and the impact on staffing though patient apportionment to the DOD staff physicians would have to be addressed to minimize patient care disruption should a DOD physician be unexpectedly pulled away for military duties. 34 
Solutions-Restructuring AFMS Manpower/Services
The deliberate two-to three-year rotation of selected specialties outside of the DOD into civilian/VA medical facilities for the maintenance of currency is possible and would likely result in greater skill sustainment compared to the RAND study's suggested program, consisting of shorter rotations and resembling the current STARS-P construct. 35 To achieve the required numbers mentioned earlier without increasing end strength, it would be necessary to consolidate surgical and medical specialties in markets that could flourish within the AFMS.
This process is already underway with the present surgical optimization program. Within the scope of this current optimization endeavor, market studies were performed indicating the best existing locations, depicted in figure 3 , where currency could be captured. 
Solutions-Impact on Recruitment/Retention
In addition to increased proficiency, there may be a significant positive impact in another area: morale and retention. In AFMS surveys on physicians leaving the service conducted in 2009 and 2010, professional satisfaction ranked second only to administrative burdens and staffing concerns as the reason most influencing a decision to leave military medicine. 36 The lack of professional satisfaction was closely linked to the limitations on the scope of practice. Though the survey results were not statistically significant, they do contend that the physician's inability to practice their full range of procedures and maintain their critical skill sets is a huge retention disincentive. It is this same lack of the scope of practice that adversely impacts the surgeons' maintenance of their wartime readiness that provides reason to explore alternatives to the existing system. Integration into the civilian/VA health care system will provide a pool of physicians immediately capable of sustaining their battlefield medicine skill set.
Conclusion
The AFMS has always provided excellent health care to its beneficiaries in garrison. The health benefit remains one of the strongest attractants to military service in addition to the patriotism of the allvolunteer force. However, the 1990's peace dividend and the resultant AFMS restructuring placed the AFMS in a precarious position for sustainment of wartime skills. AFMS personnel have produced phenomenal results in caring for the wounded, but the consummately skilled staff we have currently is a fortunate but unintended outcome of our sustained high deployment rates. With diminished exposure to appropriate case volume and complexity in garrison, the staff has sustained this excellent performance almost by accident. The rapid rotational schedules with short in garrison dwell times have kept them operating at the front. We need to create a system that is self-sustaining without relying on a wartime pace. We need to fill the in garrison time with a more meaningful practice that provides predictable war skills training. Deliberate integration into existing civilian and/or VA systems featuring robust trauma and complex case loads would provide the needed predictable training opportunity. The potential hurdles of licensure, liability, credentialing, and privileging are all surmountable, and even now, pilot TAAs have been generated to explore prospects for success.
A deliberate two-to three-year rotation would greatly sustain and enhance existing skill sets and rebuild those reduced by rotations to smaller facilities where AFMS care must be maintained to support the beneficiary population. A rotation from high volume civilian/VA medical facilities back to viable AFMS platforms would distribute skills to more junior staff and act as a positive motivation toward retention. The AFMS's readiness depends on capable staff. They need to be positioned where they can achieve this status and, at the same time, continue their exceptional service to the beneficiary population.
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